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The early sixties saw the rise o f  m ore and  m ore schools o f thought which came to  
question the accepted paradigm  in the philosophy o f science from  the 1920’s, i.e. 
logical positivism . W hat started  as a “ norm al” clash of opinions, eventually 
developed in to , as R .F . Baum  called it, the  “ crisis o f  the m odern intellect” . N o less 
th an  the objectivity o r rationality  o f  scientific knowledge became the issue under 
discussion. O n the one hand K uhn, Feyerabend, et. al. rejected the positivists’ 
conception  o f  ra tionality  as being a reduction o f the original meaning o f  hum an 
rationality . A ccording to  the “ new philosophy o f science”  rationality  has been 
reduced to  logical o r m ethodological com putability , thereby neglecting the essen­
tial fac to r o f  hum an deliberation and  judgem ent as the essence o f hum an rational 
behaviour. Logical positivists replied by labelling K uhn’s new em phasis on subjec­
tive factors in the scientific endeavour as “ irrationalistic”  and  ’’relativistic” .
It is therefore evident th a t contem porary  clashes o f philosophies o f science culmi­
nated  in the fundam ental issue o f the possibility o f reliable hum an knowledge. The 
C artesian  ideal o f  “ true and  certain”  knowledge o r the even earlier G reek ideal of 
“ infallible”  knowledge, now becam e the focus o f  philosophers o f  science. It can 
even be said th a t the broken relationship between philosophy o f science and 
epistem ology, has once again been repaired.
The m ain objective o f  this article is to  analyse the two prim ary meanings o f 
rationality  in the existing debate. I t will be show n that the existing difference» in 
m eaning can only tru ly  b t  understood if  intei preted  as the outcom e o f the funda­
m ental difference between naturalism  (positivism ) and  anti-naturalism  (histo- 
ricism). The aforem entioned aim  is thus broken dow n to  the following:
* F irst to  give a m ore precise definition o f  the rather vague concept o f  “ na tu ra ­
lism” ;
* in the second place to  give a  short sketch o f  tnc two m ost im portant representa­
tive paradigm s o f  naturalism  and  an ti-naturalism  respectively, i.e. logical positi­
vism and  K uhnian historicism; and
* and  in the th ird  place to  discuss the meaning o f “ rationality”  as it is understood 
by these tw o schools.
WHAT IS NATURALISM?
In order to  clarify some o f  the meanings o f the concept I will introduce a 
threefold distinction am ong ontological, epistem ological and m ethodological 
naturalism .
Ontological naturalism
A ccording to  this thesis the natural world is the only true world — It is Reality. 
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The non-natural (G od, spirit, m ind, idea, etc.) is either seen as apparent realities or 
reduced to  categories in  the natu ral world. The distinctive feature o f the thesis of 
ontological naturalism  is its monistic character. A ccording to  one o f its exponents 
the natu ra list opposes any dualism  between N ature and  A rt o r N atural and 
S upernatural 01 between N atural and T ranscendental1. The basic assum ption of 
this thesis is therefore tha t there is an unbreakable unity in the natural world.
Epistemological naturalism
This thesis can  be stated as follows: The natu ral w orld is either the best or the only 
know able world. The epistem ological naturalist has an unqualified belief that true 
and certain knowledge o f this natural world is w ithin m an’s reach. The reason for 
th is belief becomes clearer when one analyses their view o f the relation between 
m an and nature.
First o f all, the natural order is seen as the given, apparent world. Invisible, 
im m aterial o r  spiritual phenom ena over and above this given reality do not exist. 
Secondly, it is assumed th a t this given reality has its own intrinsic structure — 
which is o f necessity good. Any mental construct by m an must therefore aim to be 
as tru thfu l as possible. P ratt writes on this issue that N ature has a character o f its 
own, and  “ our opinions are true only in so far as they conform  to this actual 
situation” 2.
This has the im plication that m an’s role in the whole process o f knowing is rather 
passive. O ur mental constructs o f reality are a t most representations, pictures, 
im pressions o r images o f reality. M an as know er is not allowed to  impress his form 
on the natural world — N ature puts its stam p on the hum an mind!
In the final instance it is ju s t this whole passivist a ttitude that guarantees the truth 
o r certainty q f o u r knowledge. I f  m an abides by the laws of N ature (which are 
accepted as being unchanging and therefore universally valid), true and certain 
knowledge is possible. The only obstacle on the road to T ru th , is that man, more 
often than no t, in terprets these natural laws wrongly, i.e. ou r mental constructs are 
not tru thfu l representations of reality. This is then usually ascribed to  some 
subjective “ interference” on the part o f man — factors like personal bias, 
prejudice, values and emotions. Thus: T ruth  is manifest and attainable by man, but 
only if m an is objective and neutral in his approach to reality3.
Methodological naturalism
In the third instance we find naturalism  defending the view that this natural order 
can only truly be known through the operation  o f the scientific m ethod. The 
scientific method comes to  be recognized as the only instrum ent by which truthful 
knowledge of reality can be reached. Usually this method is identified with some 
stringent and form al logical rules o f inference, be they inductive or deductive. The 
im portant point to  make is tha t the scientific method must be a mechanical 
procedure — non-subjective and therefore not prone to hum an fallibility — so as to
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ensure objective knowledge.
Summary
N aturalism  takes its point o f departure  in the assum ption th a t the natural order 
constitutes a monistic and unbreakable unity. Because o f this assum ption (which 
characterizes all naturalistic philosophies from  Bacon to logical positivism), the 
ideal has always been tha t this natural unity  should be m irrored in any hum an 
(m ental) reconstruction  o f this natural order. Because it is further assumed that this 
o rder is inherently good, men should at all times conform  to this o rder and not vice 
versa. If m an does approach  N ature  with an open m ind and accepts the given data, 
T ru th  is w ithin his reach. It should be kept in mind tha t m an is considered to  be part 
o f  the natu ral order. If the causal-m echanistic relations tha t hold in the main part 
o f N ature can therefore be extended to  m an’s m ental processes, the chance o f error 
becom es sm aller. Thus: if the process o f know ing is seen as the extension o f the 
natural processes to  include m an’s mental processes, the attainm ent o f T ruth 
becomes a much bigger reality. The gap between natural laws and mental 
constructs m ust therefore be closed by a m echanical ru le /p rocedure o f inference, 
such as induction o r deduction. A lready we find here the genesis o f the positivists’ 
identification o f hum an rationality  with some mechanical means.
LO G ICAL PO SITIVISM  AND KUHN
O ne o f the interesting points th a t arises ou t o f a com parison o f the work o f the 
naturalism  of seventeenth-century Bacon and tw entieth-century logical positivism 
is their very idealistic aim s of reform ing existing scientific practice. In the same 
m anner tha t Bacon proposed a G reat R estoration o f the sciences, the Vienna Circle 
in their pam phlet in 1929 proposes a reconstruction o f existing sciences. The aim of 
both is to  erect the building of science on m ore reliable foundations
A ccording to  the m em bers o f the V ienna Circle this task can now (i.e. in the 
tw entieth century) for the first tim e in the history o f  science, truly be accom plished, 
and only as a result o f the developm ent o f symbolic logic. The task o f the 
philosopher therefore becomes a logical analysis of existing scientific concepts and 
theories in order to purify science of all metaphysical notions.
The first result o f the use o f logical analysis, is tha t a distinction is made between 
two types o f statem ents:
“ To one belong statem ents as they are m ade by em pirical science; their meaning 
can be determ ined by logical analysis or, more precisely, through reduction to  the 
sim plest statem ents about the em pirically given. The o ther statem ents, to  which 
belong those cited above, reveal themselves as em pty o f meaning if one takes then 
in the way tha t m etaphysicians intend” 4.
It is, however, no t sufficient to  show that statem ents tha t are made by empirical 
science are the only meaningful statem ents. The ideal o f science through the years
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has been the atta inm ent o f true and certain statem ents. The latter part o f their 
manifesto therefore is directed to  the objective o f  justifying their belief in the tru th  
and certainty o f statem ents made by the empirical sciences. In  true Hum ean 
trad ition  a  distinction is made between two layers o f knowledge in empirical 
science. (W hat Feigl has called the tw o-tier view o f science.)5. F irst o f all there is the 
basis o r foundation which contains the so-called Protocol sentences which refer 
directly to  the em pirical data . In  accordance w ith the thesis o f  epistemological 
naturalism  it is accepted tha t these Protocol sentences are acceptable because they 
are only the symbolic representation o f w hat has been given or received in 
observation. “ T hat knowledge o f the world is possible rests no t on hum an reason 
im pressing its form  on the m aterial, bu t on the m aterial being ordered in a certain 
way.”‘
Thus. The credibility o f  th e  foundational sentences is guaranteed through its 
empirical reference. U pon this foundation a superstructure o f  theoretical sentences 
is erected. Again, in the spirit o f methodological naturalism , the credibility o f these 
high-level theoretical sentences is guaranteed through their reduction to the 
foundational sentences. “ Since the meaning o f every statem ent o f science m ust be 
statable by reduction to  statem ent ab o u t the given, likewise the m eaning o f any 
concept, w hatever branch o f science it m ay belong te , m ust be statable by stepwise 
reduction to  o ther concepts, down to the concepts o f  the lowest level which refer 
directly to  the given” 7.
It is interesting to  note tha t the further developm ents after 1929 more or less 
focussed on these two aspects o f the naturalistic, and therefore the positivist, 
position. O n the one hand there was the problem  o f the relation between the 
basic/foundational o r Protocol sentences and the empirical given.
On the o ther hand there was the problem  o f the gap between Protocol sentences 
and the high-level theoretical superstructure. A lready in the early thirties there was 
a long debate between C arnap  and N eurath concerning the first issue, i.e. whether 
the P rotocol sentences should be understood in a phenom enalistic o r physicalist 
sense. The o ther problem  was first given serious attention  in 1936 when C arnap, in 
his “ T estability and M eaning”  changed the criterion o f verification to  a con- 
firm ation-criterion. Since then there have been two main developm ents concerning 
this very problem ; the one was C arnap’s program m e o f  an inductive logic; the o ther 
the attem pt by the Bayesians like Salm on, Hesse and Maxwell, to  interpret 
confirm ation not so much as a  logical function, bu t much more as a function of 
personal belief o r credence. It can be safely stated today tha t both  these attem pts 
have proved to  be futile.
I now proceed to  discuss K uhn’s philosophical position very briefly.
Since K uhn appeared  on the scene in the early sixties and brought about a 
revolution in the philosophy ot science in his own way, it has been a favourite topic 
in philosophy of science jou rnals to  try and find the real com m on factor in the 
so-called “ new philosophy o f science” , i.e. “ W hat is the com m on denom inator in
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the w orks of people like H anson, Toulm in, Feyerabend, Polanyi, Kuhn and even 
people like the later W ittgenstein?” .
The thesis th a t I w ould like to  defend (as stated  in the introductory  paragraphs), is 
tha t their com m on critique of different aspects o f logical positivism can be 
generalised as a new torm  o f anti-naturalism . First of all I will trv to  prove my point 
through a short outline o f K uhn’s position, and in the second place I will try to 
show in the third part o f the article, that this difference can best be seen in the 
different meanings tha t the naturalists and anti-naturalists attach  to the concept of 
“ rationality”
K uhn approaches the philosophy o f science prim arily as a historian o f science. This 
very fact can’t be emphasized too  much. W hereas the positivists ignored the genesis 
and dynamics o f scientific theories because of the fact tha t the so-called context of 
discovery is really the dom ain  o f psychology, Kuhn was prim arily interested in the 
dynam ic grow th o f scientific theories. In his study of the process he came to  the 
conclusion that the positivistic explanation of the history of science as growth- 
through-accum ulation was false and that the history of science must ra ther be 
understood as the succession o f periods of norm al and revolutionary scientific 
practices.
The characteristic feature of the norm al science phases is that science is practised in 
a particular paradigm  or W eltanschauung. A paradigm , according to  Kuhn, can be 
defined as a set o f theories and values to  which a certain scientific com m unity is 
com m itted. The acceptance o f such a com m on research trad ition , entails the 
acceptance of some com m on values and criteria which are used in norm al scientific 
practice. The specific paradigm  in which you w ork also determines how you see the 
world, how you select your facts and data , as well as the specific meaning you assign 
to  different concepts.
The appearance o f some anom alies, i.e. theoretical and observational discrepancies 
which can’t be explained by the existing paradigm , usually heralds the rise o f a new 
paradigm . Because of the all-pervasive influence o f a paradigm , it is understand­
able that the replacem ent o f  one paradigm  by a new one, is sketched as a scientific 
revolution. This leads K uhn to  make the conclusion tha t tw o successive paradigm s 
are essentially incom patible.
Because K uhn’s philosophy is very well-known today, this short exposition will 
suffice8. It rem ains for me, however, to show in w hat ways K uhn can be described 
as an anti-naturalist.
The first thesis o f naturalism , i.e. ontological naturalism , implies tha t there is only 
one, unchanging, uniform , natural world. A lthough I could no t find any reference 
in the works by K uhn to  the ontological status o f the natural world, it is, however, 
possible to  infer the following from  his position. Because every paradigm  
determ ines my perception o f the natural order, every new paradigm  does im ply a 
new and  different “ perceived reality” . This philosophical position probably comes
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nearest to  tha t o f ano ther earlier anti-naturalist, i.e. Im manuel Kant with his 
distinction between a phenomenal and noum enal world.
This h is  the second implication that Kuhn inadvertently also rejects the thesis of 
epistem ological naturalism . Because Kuhn lends priority to  the paradigm  in the 
relation between paradigm  and nature in the sense that the paradigm determines 
one’s perception of the world, one's selection o f data , the criteria one accepts in 
problem -solving, etc., one could say that the paradigm  constitutes a new concep­
tual world.
In The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions Kuhn writes the following: “ Moppirig-up 
operations are what engage most scientists throughout their careers. They consti­
tute w hat I am here calling norm al science. Closely examined, whether historically 
or in the contem porary laboratory, that enterprise seems an attem pt to force nature 
into the perform ed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies” ''. 
C oncerning the first aspect o f the thesis o f epistemological naturalism  Kuhn 
therefore rejects the view that concepts and theories are only representations o f an 
unchanging natural world. This view of the character of theories will in the second 
place also have implications for the problem of truth. In a response to Popper Kuhn 
states the following: “ Sir Karl takes it for granted that the proponents o f compeiing 
theories do share a neutral language adequate to the com parison of such observa­
tion reports. I am about to  argue that they do net. If I am right, then ‘tru th ’ may. 
like ‘p ro o f  be a term with only intra-theoretic applications” 10. Kuhn then goes on 
to  discuss the whole problem of the incom m ensurability o f successive paradigms, 
and concludes as follows: “ In the absence of a nutral language, the choice of a new 
theory is a decision to  adopt a different native language, and to  deploy it in a 
correspondingly different world. That sort o f transition is, however, not one which 
the terms ‘choice’ and ‘decision’ quite fit” " .
To summarise: Kuhn is compelled, in a sense, because o f his particular view of 
paradigm s and their relation to  nature, to reject the view that tru th  is something 
universal, objective and therefore inter-paradigm atic. At the most Kuhn is prepa­
red to defend the intra-paradigm atic goal o f tru th  and especially then as the 
continued solving o f problems.
The most im portant o f K uhn’s critiques o f positivism can, however, be found in his 
rejection o f the thesis o f methodological naturalism . As you will remember this 
thesis am ounts to the belief that the scientific method is the only instrum ent 
through which true and certain knowledge of reality can be searched. The other 
im portan t point that we made was that the scientific method is usually seen as a 
mechanical procedure whereby scientific and non-scientific knowledge can be 
dem arcated. A lready on the third page of TSOSR, Kuhn rem arks that one of the 
results o f his historical study is to  show, and I quote, “ The insufficiency of 
m ethodological directives, by themselves, to  dictate a unique substantive conclu­
sion to many sorts of scientific questions’’12. In another article he writes that 
“ There can be no set o f rules o f choice adequate to  dictate desired individual 
behaviour in the concrete cases that scientists will meet in the course o f their
r a r i ^ r c ” 13
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Kuhn therefore explicitly rejects the positivist and also naturalist ideal o f a strictly 
m echanical (o r logical) procedure which will decide as it where on behalf of the 
scientist between scientific and non-scientific knowledge. According to K uhn it is 
the scientist's com m itm ent to  certain paradigm atic values that helps him to  choose 
acceptable scientific theories.
In conclusion, K uhn’s position is thus: Because o f the inverted relation between 
paradigm  and changing reality, as well as the inner complexity o f the paradigm ’s 
structure, it is unrealistic to  believe (like the positivists do) tha t an analysis o f the 
form al relation between theory and evidence can give us an explanation of why one 
theory is replaced by a new one. It is only when one takes in to  consideration 
inter-paradigm atic relations and  especially the paradigm -induced values that 
scientists accept in times o f  theory-choice tha t one can get a  better understanding of 
scientific evaluation.
RATIONALITY
This brings me to  my last and final point, i.e. the m eaning o f rationality in the 
positivist and K uhnian paradigm s.
Since the earliest philosophizing about problem s o f knowledge, the search for 
knowledge has been synonym ous w ith the search fo r infallible knowledge. The 
central role in philosophy o f  the quest for infallibility is equally well illustrated by 
the persistent search for some unequivocal foundation on which the edifice of 
knowledge can be built. We have exam ined the logical positivists’ attem pt to  take 
the em pirically given as the foundation  o f  knowledge. It is, however, pertinent to  
take a closer look at the o ther pillar o f knowledge in the positivists’ program m e, i.e. 
the inference from  the superstructure to  foundational sentences. We have seen 
earlier tha t an im portan t im plication o f the epistemological naturalist’s point of 
view is the elim ination o f  all hum an, and  by definitioin, subjective factors from  the 
scientific process. This aspect finds it most evident effect in the positivists’s distinc­
tion between the contexts o f discovery and  justification. By limiting the legitimate 
dom ain  o f the philosophy o f science to  the la tter, the positivist was ju s t following 
the trad ition  o f replacing fallible hum an judgem ent by a set o f algorithm s. I quote 
H aro ld  Brown to  the effect tha t “ This ideal controlled early logical positivist ideas 
on the verification o f theories, receiving its m ost extreme expression in W ittgen­
stein’s attem pt to  reduce all propositions to  tru th  factions o f atom ic propositions. 
... T his program m e has, we have seen, been abandoned  and replaced, am ong 
logical empiricists, by the search fo r an inductive logic based on probability theory. 
Again the project is to  find an alogorithm  on the basis o f  which we can evaluate 
scientific theories, the assum ption being th a t even if we cannot prove the final tru th  
o f  an  hypothesis, we can produce a  set o f  rules which will allow  us to  determ ine the 
degree to  which it has been confirm ed by the available evidence” 14.
Brown then makes the very relevant rem ark th a t “ The attem pt by logical
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empiricists to  identify rationality with algorithmic com putability is somewhat 
strange, since it deems rational only those hum an acts which could in principle be 
carried ou t w ithout the presence o f a hum an being!” 15. If one takes Brown’s 
argum ent to  its logical conclusion it means tha t to  be rational in the positivist’s 
m eaning o f the w ord, is to  act non-rationally  (i.e. w ithout using your mind). 
Brown, however, takes ano ther line: A ccording to  him  it is even, w ith all the 
algorithm s in the w orld, possible to  act irrationally , in the positivists' sense o f the 
word. “ There are m any different directions in which the scientist can proceed in 
attem pting to  deduce testable consequences from  his hypothesis, each o f which 
may be strictly in accordance with a  set o f algorithm s, bu t he has no algorithm  for 
determ ing which line to  pursue. An inform ed judgem ent is required and it is in 
making such judgem ents tha t we m ust rely on reason. As long as decisions can be 
carried ou t by means of algorithm s, hum an intervention is not necessary, it is 
exactly when we have no effective procedures to  guide us tha t we must tu rn  to  an 
inform ed, rational hum an judgm ent” 16.
If we tu rn  to Kuhn now, we see th a t it is precisely because o f his historical survey of 
scientific theories th a t he came to  reject the positivist concept o f rationality. Both 
he and people like Feyerabend and H olton have conclusively shown, I think, that 
there is no clear, simple relation between the results c f  experiment o r observation 
and scientific theories. Even in the simplest, m ost straightforw ard instance, i.e. the 
case o f an observational result which contradicts a theory, the practising scientist is 
no t bound autom atically to  reject part o f his theory. The decision as to how a 
discrepancy between theory and observation is to  be handled requires a judgem ent 
by scientists. This, I take it, is the th rust o f  some o f K uhn’s most-widely attacked 
claims, e.g. that such questions (o f theory choice) “ can never be settled by logic and 
experim ent alone” and “ the com petition between paradigm s is not the sort of 
battle that can be resolved by proofs” .
To understand K uhn’s concept o f rationality  better, Brown suggests tha t one 
should com pare K uhn’s position with A ristotle’s m an o f practical wisdom as he is 
sketched in his Ethics. F or A ristotle, ethics is concerned with hum an behaviour and 
because o f the complexity o f hum an behaviour, there are no first principles on the 
basis o f which to  construct a science. Ethical decisions require deliberation, the 
ability to  weigh inform ation and m ake decisions in cases in which there is no 
necessary knowledge. The conclusion is not infallible and there is no guarantee that 
all adequately inform ed people who deliberate on an issue will reach the same 
decision, but this does not make the decision arb itrary  o r irrational. While Aris­
to tle’s man o f practical wisdom, i.e. the m an who has had sufficient experience to 
understand hum an behaviour and has developed his ability to  deliberate, offers a 
model o f individual rationality , K uhn uses, I th ink , basically the same model of 
rationality  — only on the level o f the com m unity o f  scientists. In a well-known 
statem ent K uhn gives a  description o f the process o f com m unal deliberation: 
“ Take a group o f the ablest available people with the most appropriate m otivation; 
train  them  in some science and in the specialities relevant to  the choice at hand; 
imbue them  with the value system, the ideology, current in their discipline and, 
finally, let them make the choice” 17.
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Brown concludes th a t “ It is the consensus o f the workers in a discipline that 
determ ines w hat constitu tes knowledge in this discipline, bu t the group may later 
discover th a t it made a mistake. The group is no m ore infallible than  the individual 
(bu t this does no t m ean th a t it is as fallible as the individual” " .
It should  be evident by now  in w hat way K uhn’s concept o f rationality  is also the 
result o f his particular anti-naturalistic point o f  view.
Because K uhn rejects the m ain thesis o f naturalism , and proceeds on the basis o f 
the prio rity  o f som e theoretical structure, i.e. a  paradigm , it could be interpreted in 
a  negative way, as a restriction o f scientist’s activities. Scientists’ whole perceptual, 
conceptual and  even sem antic m ake-up is already laid down by the paradigm  to 
w hich they are com m itted. If  one looks a t it, however, from  the point o f view of 
decision-m aking, the adherence to  a paradigm  seems to  become m ore and  m ore 
attractive. Because a paradigm  dictates certain  ways o f doing things, because a 
paradigm  provides com m on criteria and values th a t can be utilised in times of 
crisis, the possibility o f consensus is so much greater. The reason why group 
decisions th roughout the history o f science, seem to  be relatively unanim ous can 
then be understood as a function o f the paradigm s tha t scientists adhered to.
In conclusion I th ink th a t the m ain lesson to  be learned, can be found in the 
trad ition  o f W estern Philosophy to  identify knowledge with infallibility and truth. 
I f  one accepts knowledge to  be reasonable o r  even justified belief, it does not entail 
the fu rther thesis, i.e. th a t knowledge should necessarily be true and infallible. 
W hat counts as a reasonable belief will certainly differ from  time to  time, and  from 
context to  context If this is seen as relativism , then all hum an knowledge will be 
relativistic.
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